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This study explores the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on innovation of
different types of firms. We develop an open-economy R&D-based growth model and
obtain the following result: raising the minimum wage reduces innovation of firms
that use domestic inputs but increases innovation of firms that import foreign inputs.
Intuitively, when the minimum wage increases, importing firms substitute labor with
imported inputs, which have technology spillovers and enhance their innovation. We
test this result using city-level data on minimum wages and firm-level patent data in
China. Finally, we find that in accordance with our theory, raising the minimum wage
is associated with more innovation by importing firms and less by non-importing firms.
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1 Introduction
In the latest 40 years, China achieved and maintained a high rate of economic growth and
a rapid expansion in international trade. Now, China has become the largest country in the
world in terms of bilateral trade. Meanwhile, labor costs in China have increased dramati-
cally. An important contributing factor is the rising minimum wages in China. Does a rise
in minimum wages affect firms’ innovation? If so, does this effect vary across firms’ trade
status?
This study explores the effects of minimum wage on innovation. The novelty of our
analysis is that we consider the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on different types
of firms. First, we develop an open-economy R&D-based growth model in which some firms
import inputs from abroad and others use domestic inputs. Then, we apply this growth-
theoretic framework to explore the different effects of minimum wage on the innovation of
the two types of firms. Finally, we test our theoretical results using firm-level patent data
and city-level data on minimum wages in China.
Within our growth-theoretic framework, raising the minimum wage reduces innovation of
firms that use domestic inputs but increases innovation of firms that import foreign inputs.
Intuitively, when a higher minimum wage reduces employment, importing firms respond
by importing a larger amount of inputs. Following empirical evidence such as Amiti and
Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), Bloom et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2017), and Mo et
al. (2019), we assume that imported inputs give rise to technology spillovers from abroad.
As a result, the increase in imported inputs enhances research efficiency of importing firms
and leads to a reallocation of research labor from non-importing firms to importing firms.
Consequently, innovation of non-importing firms decreases, whereas innovation of importing
firms increases.
In our empirical analysis, we construct a merged dataset from the following data sources:
annual firm-level manufacturing survey data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(NBSC); firm-level patent applications from China National Intellectual Property Admin-
istration (CNIPA); firm-product-level trade data from China’s General Administration of
Customs (CGAC); and city-level minimum-wage and economic data. We find that the im-
pacts of minimum wage vary across importing firms and non-importing firms. Consistent
with our theoretical predictions, a higher minimum wage is associated with a lower level of
innovation (measured by patents) by non-importing firms but a higher level of innovation by
importing firms. We then conduct additional tests to address potential endogeneity issues.
Following the approach of Dube et al. (2010) and Fan et al. (2018), we construct a dataset
of all city pairs across province borders to identify the effects of minimum wage on patent
applications. In addition, we also employ instrumental variables for both the minimum wage
and the import status to solve the endogeneity issue. Moreover, we study the heterogeneous
effects across different capital intensity and find that the impact of minimum wage is higher
for firms with lower capital intensity.1 Finally, the impacts of minimum wage on patent
citations, firm’s product scope, TFP and labor employment are also consistent with our
theoretical predictions.
1This is consistent with Bai et al. (2018) and Fan et al. (2018), who show a greater effect of minimum
wage on export performances and FDI in industries with higher labor intensity, respectively.
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This study relates to the theoretical literature on innovation and economic growth. Sem-
inal studies by Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
and Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the R&D-based growth model. While all of these
early studies feature full employment, some subsequent studies use different approaches to
incorporate equilibrium unemployment into the R&D-based growth model.2 A branch of this
literature uses variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the effects of minimum
wage on unemployment and innovation; see Askenazy (2003), Meckl (2004), Agenor and Lim
(2018), Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa, and Liao (2020), and Chu, Kou, and Wang (2020). This
study contributes to this literature by showing that minimum wage has heterogeneous effects
on innovation of different firms, and by testing these heterogeneous effects using firm-level
data.
This study also relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of innovation and
productivity. Within this literature, our paper is most closely related to Amiti and Konings
(2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), Bloom et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2017) and Mo et al. (2019),
who use firm-level data to show that imported inputs enhance innovation and productivity.3
Complementing these interesting studies, our study examines the effects of minimum wage
on firms’ innovation by using the dataset of patent applications and shows that minimum
wage affects non-importing firms and importing firms differently via imported inputs and
their spillover effects on technologies.4
This paper also belongs to the vast literature on the economic effects of minimum wage
regulations in China. Among them, Wang and Gunderson (2011), Huang et al. (2014),
Fang and Lin (2015), Long and Yang (2016) and Bai et al. (2018) study the effects of
minimum wages on labor employment. Mayneris et al. (2018) and Hau et al. (2020)
examine the impacts of minimum wages on firms’ input-substitution, management practice
and productivity. Gan et al. (2016) and Fan et al. (2018) study the relationship between
changes in the minimum wage and firms’ export and FDI, respectively.5 However, none of
these papers analyze the differentiated effects of minimum wage on innovation for importing
firms and non-importing firms. We aim to fill this gap in the literature.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents our theoretical results. Section 4 describes the institutional background,
data and empirical specification. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis. We provide
concluding remarks in section 6.
2 An open-economy R&D-based growth model
In this section, we develop an innovation-driven growth model. The open-economy R&D-
based growth model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991b). We follow Chu, Fan, Shen,
2See for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for search frictions, Parello (2010) for efficiency wage,
Peretto (2011) for wage bargaining, and Chu, Cozzi, and Furukawa (2016), Ji et al. (2016), and Chu, Kou,
and Liu (2018) for trade unions.
3Lu and Ng (2012) also use firm-level data to show that imports spur incremental innovation in China.
4Liu et al. (2015) and Liu and Qiu (2016) find that trade policies also have multiple effects on innovation.
5Chan (2019) studies how Chinese import competition affects US local labor market and finds that US
regions with higher minimum wages are less affected by import competition from China.
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and Zhang (2018) to extend the Grossman-Helpman model to multiple sectors. Specifically,
firms in one sector use domestic inputs for the production of differentiated products, whereas
those in the other sector use foreign inputs. Furthermore, we generalize the model in Chu,
Fan, Shen, and Zhang (2018) by introducing minimum wage and allowing for a nonunitary
elasticity of substitution between labor and imported inputs in production. For simplicity,
we assume that the terms of trade are exogenous, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
2.1 Household
In the economy, there is a representative household, whose utility function is
U =
∫
∞
0
e−ρt(lnCy,t + γ lnCz,t)dt. (1)
The parameter ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Cy,t is the consumption of a domestic
final good, which is chosen as the numeraire.6 The parameter γ ≥ 0 determines the impor-
tance of the consumption of a foreign final good Cz,t imported from abroad.
7 pz is the price
of this foreign good, and also the terms of trade, which is exogenous for simplicity.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
a˙t = rtat + wh,t + wl,t(L
d
t + L
f
t ) + bt(l − L
d
t − L
f
t )− τt − Cy,t − pzCz,t, (2)
where at is the amount of assets, and rt is the interest rate.
8 The household supplies one
unit of high-skill research labor to earn the high-skill wage rate wh,t, which is higher than
the minimum wage. The household also supplies l units of low-skill production labor, among
which Ldt +L
f
t units work in the two production sectors {d, f} and earn the minimum wage
wl,t. The unemployed low-skill labor l−L
d
t −L
f
t receives unemployment benefit bt < wl,t. τt
is a lump-sum tax collected by the government. Standard dynamic optimization yields the
following optimality conditions:
C˙y,t
Cy,t
= rt − ρ, (3)
Cz,t = γCy,t/pz. (4)
2.2 Domestic final good
Competitive firms produce domestic final good Yt. The production function is
Yt = (X
d
t )
0.5(Xft )
0.5, (5)
6Domestic final goods can be consumed by the household, used to produce intermediate inputs, or ex-
ported.
7Imported foreign final goods can be consumed by the household or used to produce intermediate inputs.
8Here, we assume financial autarky under which the domestic financial market is not integrated to the
global financial market. This assumption is reasonable given capital control in China. Under the assumption
of financial autarky, it can be shown that the asset-accumulation equation ensures balanced trade.
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where Xdt is the intermediate good that uses domestic inputs, and X
f
t is the intermediate
good that uses foreign inputs. From profit maximization, we derive the conditional demand
functions for Xdt and X
f
t as
Xdt =
Yt
2P dt
, (6)
Xft =
Yt
2P ft
, (7)
where P dt is the price of X
d
t and P
f
t is the price of X
f
t .
2.3 Intermediate goods
Competitive firms produce intermediate good i ∈ {d, f}. The production function for Xdt is:
Xdt =

(1− α)(Ldt ) ε−1ε + α
[∫ ndt
0
[xdt (ω)]
αdω
] ε−1
αε


ε
ε−1
, (8a)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic production labor Ldt and
domestic capital goods xdt (ω) for ω ∈ [0, n
d
t ]. Similarly, the production function for X
f
t is:
Xft =

(1− α)(Lft ) ε−1ε + α
[∫ nft
0
[xft (ω)]
αdω
] ε−1
αε


ε
ε−1
, (8b)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic production labor Lft and foreign
capital goods xft (ω) for ω ∈ [0, n
f
t ].
9 This nonunitary elasticity of substitution between labor
and imported capital goods will interact with the technology spillovers of imported capital
goods to affect innovation. From profit maximization, we derive the conditional demand
functions for Lit and x
i
t(ω) as
wl,t = (1− Φ
d
t )
P dt X
d
t
Ldt
= (1− Φft )
P ft X
f
t
Lft
, (9)
pdt (ω) = Φ
d
t
P dt X
d
t∫ ndt
0
[xdt (ω)]
αdω
[xdt (ω)]
α−1, (10a)
pft (ω) = Φ
f
t
P ft X
f
t∫ nft
0
[xft (ω)]
αdω
[xft (ω)]
α−1, (10b)
where
Φit ≡
α
[∫ nit
0
[xit(ω)]
αdω
] ε−1
αε
(1− α)(Lit)
ε−1
ε + α
[∫ nit
0
[xit(ω)]
αdω
] ε−1
αε
,
9It is useful to note thatXft is produced by combining domestic labor L
f
t and foreign input x
f
t (ω) imported
from abroad. So, Xft is not a foreign good but a domestically produced good that uses some foreign inputs.
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and pit(ω) is the price of x
i
t(ω) for i ∈ {d, f}.
2.4 Domestic capital goods
A monopolistic firm uses xdt (ω) units of domestic final goods to produce x
d
t (ω) units of
domestic capital good ω ∈ [0, ndt ].
10 Therefore, the profit function for producing xdt (ω) units
of domestic capital good ω is
πdt (ω) = p
d
t (ω)x
d
t (ω)− x
d
t (ω) = Φ
d
t
P dt X
d
t∫ ndt
0
[xdt (ω)]
αdω
[xdt (ω)]
α − xdt (ω). (11)
The monopolistic price is pdt (ω) = 1/α, and the amount of profit for ω ∈ [0, n
d
t ] is
πdt (ω) =
1− α
α
xdt (ω) = (1− α) Φ
d
t
P dt X
d
t
ndt
= (1− α) Φdt
Yt
2ndt
≡ πdt , (12)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (10a), and pdt (ω) = 1/α. Later on, we will show
that the economy features a steady state (instead of a balanced growth path) due to the
obsolescence of products.11 The steady-state value of an invention is:
vdt (ω) =
πdt (ω)
r + δ
= (1− α) Φdt
Yt
2ndt
1
ρ+ δ
≡ vdt , (13)
where the parameter δ > 0 is the probability that a product becomes obsolete.
2.5 Foreign capital goods
A monopolistic firm imports xft (ω) units of foreign final good to produce x
f
t (ω) units of
foreign capital good ω ∈ [0, nft ].
12 Therefore, the profit function for producing xft (ω) units
of foreign capital good ω is
πft (ω) = p
f
t (ω)x
f
t (ω)− pzx
f
t (ω) = Φ
f
t
P ft X
f
t∫ nft
0
[xft (ω)]
αdω
[xft (ω)]
α − pzx
f
t (ω). (14)
The monopolistic price is pft (ω) = pz/α, and the amount of profit for ω ∈ [0, n
f
t ] is
πft (ω) =
1− α
α
pzx
f
t (ω) = (1− α) Φ
f
t
P ft X
f
t
nft
= (1− α) Φft
Yt
2nft
≡ πft , (15)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (10b), and pft (ω) = pz/α. The steady-state
value of an invention is
vft (ω) =
πft (ω)
r + δ
= (1− α) Φft
Yt
2nft
1
ρ+ δ
≡ vft , (16)
where δ > 0 is once again the probability that a product becomes obsolete.
10A firm may own the patents for producing multiple varieties of domestic capital goods.
11See also Grossman and Lai (2004).
12An importing firm may own the patents to produce multiple varieties of foreign capital goods.
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2.6 R&D for non-importing firms
We refer to firms in the sector that uses only domestic capital goods as non-importing firms.
Firms in this sector d devote one unit of domestic high-skill research labor to invent a new
variety of differentiated products. The zero-profit condition of R&D in sector d is given by:
vdt = w
h
t . (17)
Together with the obsolescence δ of existing products, the law of motion for ndt is given by:
n˙dt = R
d
t − δn
d
t , (18)
where Rdt denotes domestic R&D labor in sector d. Therefore, the steady-state level of n
d
t is
given by nd = Rd/δ, which is increasing in R&D labor in the sector.
2.7 R&D for importing firms
We refer to firms in the sector that uses foreign capital goods as importing firms. Firms in
this sector f devote 1/(1+λIt) units of domestic high-skill research labor to inventing a new
variety of differentiated products. The zero-profit condition of R&D in sector f is given by
vft = w
h
t /(1+ λIt). Together with the obsolescence δ of existing products, the law of motion
for nft is given by:
n˙ft = (1 + λIt)R
f
t − δn
f
t , (19)
where Rft denotes domestic R&D labor in sector f . Therefore, the steady-state level of n
f
t
is given by nf = (1 + λI)Rf/δ, where λ > 0 is an import-spillover parameter. We assume
that the productivity of Rft depends on the intensity It of imported inputs. Specifically, the
value of imported inputs as a ratio of output is:
It ≡ pz,t
∫ nft
0
xft (ω)dω/Yt.
We adapt this specification from Grossman and Helpman (1991b), who also assume that
knowledge spillovers arise from trade.13 Imposing symmetry and using (7) and (15), one can
show that It = αΦ
f
t /2. If we define λ ≡ λα/2, then the zero-profit condition of R&D in
sector f can be expressed as:
(1 + λΦft )v
f
t = w
h
t , (20)
where λΦft = λIt captures the spillover effects of imported inputs.
13See Coe and Helpman (1995) for empirical evidence that trade stimulates international spillovers, and
Chen et al. (2017) and Mo et al. (2019) for evidence that imported inputs stimulate innovation.
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2.8 Government
The government sets a minimum wage that is binding in the production sectors. The total
supply of low-skill production labor is l, and unemployment is l−Ldt −L
f
t . The government
sets the minimum wage as:
wl,t = µ. (21)
Combining (6), (7), (9), and (21) yields the level of low-skill employment in the two sectors:
Ldt = (1− Φ
d
t )
Yt
2µ
, (22a)
Lft = (1− Φ
f
t )
Yt
2µ
. (22b)
For a sufficiently large µ, the minimum wage is binding such that Ldt + L
f
t < l. Finally, the
government levies a lump-sum tax τt on the household to pay for the unemployment benefit
bt subject to
τt = bt(l − L
d
t − L
f
t ). (23)
2.9 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations {Cz,t, Cy,t, Yt, X
d
t , X
f
t , x
d
t (ω), x
f
t (ω), L
d
t , L
f
t , R
d
t , R
f
t }
∞
t=0
and prices {pz, rt, w
h
t , w
l
t, P
d
t , P
f
t , p
d
t (ω), p
f
t (ω), v
d
t , v
f
t }
∞
t=0. At each instance of time, the fol-
lowing is true.
• the representative household chooses {Cz,t, Cy,t} to maximize lifetime utility, given
{pz, rt, w
h
t , w
l
t};
• competitive firms produce Yt to maximize profit, given {P
d
t , P
f
t };
• competitive firms produce Xdt to maximize profit, given {w
l
t, P
d
t , p
d
t (ω)};
• competitive firms produce Xft to maximize profit, given {w
l
t, P
f
t , p
f
t (ω)};
• a monopolistic firm produces xdt (ω) and sets p
d
t (ω) to maximize profit;
• a monopolistic firm produces xft (ω) and sets p
f
t (ω) to maximize profit, given pz;
• R&D labor Rdt performs innovation to maximize profit, given {w
h
t , v
d
t };
• R&D labor Rft performs innovation to maximize profit, given {w
h
t , v
f
t };
• the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor holds such that Rdt +R
f
t = 1;
• the minimum wage in the low-skill labor market implies Ldt + L
f
t < l;
• the trade account is balanced such that Yt−Cy,t−
∫ ndt
0
xdt (ω)dω = pzCz,t+pz
∫ nft
0
xft (ω)dω.
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3 Effects of minimum wage on innovation
We now examine the steady-state effects of minimum wage. From (22a), production labor Ldt
in sector d is decreasing in the minimum-wage parameter µ for a given Φd and Yt. From (22b),
production labor Lft in sector f is also decreasing in µ for a given Φ
f and Yt. Intuitively,
an increase in the minimum wage reduces labor demand and the employment level. From
(10b), the income share Φf of imported capital goods in sector f is:
Φf =
α
[
(nf )1/αxf
](ε−1)/ε
(1− α)(Lf )(ε−1)/ε + α [(nf )1/αxf ]
(ε−1)/ε
, (24)
which is decreasing in Lf for a given (nf )1/αxf . In other words, for a given (nf )1/αxf , a
higher minimum wage µ leads to an increase in the income share Φf of imported capital
goods by decreasing Lf due to the substitutability between labor and imported inputs.
Combining (13), (16), (17), and (20) yields the steady-state ratio of relative technology
between the two sectors as
nf
nd
=
(1 + λΦf )Φf
Φd
, (25)
which is increasing in Φf due to the technology spillovers λΦf of imported capital goods in
sector f . Substituting nf = (1 + λΦf )Rf/δ and nd = Rd/δ in (25) yields the relative level
of R&D labor between the two sectors as:
Rf
Rd
=
Rf
1−Rf
=
Φf
Φd
, (26)
where the first equality uses the resource constraint on high-skill labor, Rd + Rf = 1. In
the proof of Proposition 1, we show that Φf is increasing in minimum wage µ and that the
ratio Φf/Φd is increasing in µ if and only if λ > 0. In this case, R&D labor Rf in sector
f is increasing in minimum wage µ, whereas R&D labor Rd in sector d is decreasing in
µ. Intuitively, when a higher minimum wage reduces employment, importing firms respond
by importing more capital goods,14 which have technology spillovers and improve research
efficiency in sector f . This leads to a reallocation of research labor from sector d to sector
f . As a result, the level of innovation nf = (1+λΦf )Rf/δ in sector f increases, whereas the
level of innovation nd = Rd/δ in sector d decreases. Finally, from (22), we can derive that
Lf/Ld = (1− Φf )/(1− Φd), which is decreasing in the minimum wage parameter µ.
The above results can be summarized as follows. First, raising the minimum wage has a
negative effect on non-importing firms’ innovation. Second, raising the minimum wage has
a positive effect on importing firms’ innovation. Third, raising the minimum wage causes a
fall in the production labor of importing firms relative to non-importing firms (i.e., Lf/Ld).
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 If the elasticity of substitution is not excessively large, such that ε < (1 −
α/2)/(1 − α), then the economy features a unique steady-state equilibrium. In this case,
14In Table C1, we empirically show that a rise in minimum wage increases firms’ imported capital goods,
capital, and capital-labor ratio.
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raising the minimum wage causes the following effects: (1) a decrease in innovation of non-
importing firms; (2) an increase in innovation of importing firms; and (3) a decrease in the
production labor of importing firms relative to non-importing firms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.1 An extension
In our benchmark model, we assume that a monopolistic firm either uses domestic or foreign
inputs. We consider an extension of our model in which all of the monopolistic firms use
domestic and foreign inputs, but the intensity differs across firms. Suppose a monopolistic
firm uses ψxdt (ω) units of domestic final good and imports (1− ψ) x
d
t (ω) units of foreign
final good to produce xdt (ω) units of domestic-input-intensive capital good ω ∈ [0, n
d
t ], where
ψ ∈ (0.5, 1] denotes the factor intensity of domestic inputs in the production of domestic-
input-intensive capital goods. Similarly, a monopolistic firm uses (1 − ψ)xft (ω) units of
domestic final good and imports ψxft (ω) units of foreign final good to produce x
f
t (ω) units of
foreign-input-intensive capital goods ω ∈ [0, nft ], where ψ ∈ (0.5, 1] again denotes the factor
intensity of foreign input in the production of foreign-input-intensive capital goods.15 Hence,
our benchmark model is a special case with ψ = 1. In Appendix B, we show that there exists
a range of ψ ∈ [ψˆ, 1] in which our results hold.
4 Institutional background, data, and empirical speci-
fication
In this section, we first introduce the minimum-wage system and the patent system in China.
Then, we describe the data employed in our empirical analysis. Finally, we specify our main
regression and describe the key components of the econometric model.
4.1 China’s minimum-wage system
In November 1993, the former Ministry of Labor of China issued the first national minimum
wage regulations, which were written into the Labor Law in 1994. All of the provincial,
autonomous-region, and municipal governments are authorized to set their local minimum
wages according to their economic development levels, which can vary across cities within
a province. When setting their minimum wages, governments are required to consider local
factors such as the living expenses of urban residents, average wages, unemployment rate,
and level of economic development.
Due to weak supervision, the minimum wage regulations were not well implemented
in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security
(restructured from the Chinese Ministry of Labor) passed and reinforced the Minimum Wage
15In general, we can allow ψ to be different in the production of the two types of capital goods.
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Regulations (Gan et al., 2016; Fan et al., 2018), which were more strongly enforced than the
original regulations. Article 4 in the new minimum wage regulations emphasizes that “Labor
unions at all levels shall supervise the implementation of these regulations in accordance with
the law, and when discovering wages paid by employers in violation of these regulations,
they are obliged to require the local labor security administrative department to handle it.”
Moreover, the new regulations expanded the scope of the original minimum wage standards.
In addition to the monthly minimum wage standards for full-time employed workers, they
required the hourly minimum wage to be paid to part-time workers. The new regulations
significantly increased the compensation that firms in violation of the minimum wage system
should pay to workers, from 10%-20% of the owed wages to 100%-500%. Finally, provincial
governments were required to renew the minimum wage standard at least once every two
years after 2004, and local governments were required to publish the minimum wage rates
in government bulletins and newspapers within a week after a change.
We collect the minimum wage data of Chinese cities from 2000 to 2012 from government
websites of cities. Figure 1 shows the changes in China’s minimum wage during this period.
From 2000 to 2012, the average monthly minimum wage in Chinese cities rose from 267
Yuan to 1,006 Yuan, and its standard deviation gradually increased as well. Compared to
2000, the city with the highest minimum wage increase in 2012 was Ordos in Inner Mongolia,
where the minimum wage in 2012 was 7.06 times that in 2000. The cities with the lowest
increase were Qingyuan and Yangjiang from Guangdong Province, where the minimum wage
in 2012 was 2.36 times that in 2000.16 We also calculate the ratio of the firms’ average wage
to the city level minimum wage to see how binding minimum wages in China are. A lower
ratio implies that the local minimum wage is more likely to be binding. The mean of this
ratio in our sample is 2.31.
Figure 1: China’s minimum wage: 2000-2012
16The city with the highest minimum wage in 2000 and 2012 was Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, at
547 yuan and 1500 yuan, respectively.
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4.2 China’s patent system
After the patent law was enacted in April 1985, the China National Intellectual Property
Administration (CNIPA) started to receive and examine patent applications. Patents in
CNIPA fall in three categories: invention, utility model, and design. Invention patents
represent core technological progress, necessitating substantive examination of novelty and
non-obviousness. Utility models and designs are treated as trivial patents, only requiring
formative examination. China’s patent law has experienced three amendments. The first,
in 1992, mainly extended the statutory life of invention patents from 15 years to 20 years.
The second, in 2001, mainly prepared for China to join the WTO by satisfying the minimum
requirements of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) on intellectual property protection. This amendment extended 20-year protection
to inventions with patents applied for before the end of 1992 and still valid on December 11,
2001. The third, in 2009, mainly increased the patentability requirement, changing “relative
novelty” to “absolute novelty.” China is undertaking a fourth amendment, whose draft has
recently been circulated for public feedback.
From 2001 to 2013, the number of patent applications in CNIPA increased dramatically
from 203,573 to 2,377,061 with an average annual growth rate of 22.73%. As shown in
Figure 2, China’s domestic firms had became the main driving force of invention patent
applications, while among 68,137 invention patents in 2001, domestic firms accounted for
9.08%, but among 726,961 invention patents in 2013, domestic firms accounted for 50.71%.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, the average number of patent applications of importing
firms is much larger than non-importing firms from 2001 to 2013, and the comparative
advantage of importing firms to non-importing ones became larger since the minimum wage
was strictly enforced in 2004.
Figure 2: China’s invention applications and domestic firms’ share: 2001-2013
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Figure 3: Importing and non-importing firms’ patent applications per firm: 2001-2013
4.3 Data
This paper uses four datasets: (1) annual firm-level manufacturing survey data from the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC); (2) firm-level patent applications from the
China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA); (3) firm-product-level trade
data from China’s General Administration of Customs (CGAC); and (4) city-level minimum
wage and economic data.
First, we use the firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF),
which have been widely used in literature on the Chinese economy (Brandt et al., 2012; Fan
et al., 2018; Gan et al., 2016). This dataset contains rich firm-level information from 1998 to
2013, including basic firm information (e.g., firm name, address, age, ownership structure,
employment, capital stock, gross output,and value added), and complete information on the
three major accounting statements (balance sheet, profit and loss account, and cash flow
statement). Until 2006, this dataset covers all of the state-owned firms and non-state-owned
firms with annual sales income of more than 5 million yuan. After 2006, it covers all of the
firms with annual sales income of more than 5 million yuan. From 2011 to 2013, it covers
all of the firms with annual sales income of more than 20 million yuan.17
The second dataset is transaction-level import and export data from the China General
Administration of Customs (CGAC). This dataset includes information on each import and
export transaction of Chinese firms from 2000 to 2013, including firm name, product codes,
value, and quantity. According to product classification by broad economic categories (BEC),
we determine whether the imported products are capital goods.18
17Following Brandt et al. (2012), we delete problematic observations resulting from misreporting, as
follows: (1) annual revenue missing or less than 5 million yuan; (2) total asset data missing; (3) liquid assets
surpassing total assets; (4) fixed assets surpassing total assets; and (5) labor missing or less than 8.
18Capital goods are those with BEC classification codes of 41 and 521 as provided by the United Nations;
see BEC classification at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/classifications/bec.asp.
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The third dataset is patent data from the China National Intellectual Property Admin-
istration (CNIPA). This dataset includes information on each patent application in China
since 1985, including the applicant name, address, patent name, and patent category (i.e.,
invention patent, utility model, or design). We obtain the citation information of each in-
vention patent from Google Patent.
We match the above three firm-level datasets by firms’ name. The matching methods and
results are shown in Table C2. The last dataset is the minimum wage and economic data at
the city level. Since there is no uniform data source for minimum wage by city, we manually
collect this information from 2000-2012 from the official websites of local governments. In
addition, we obtain per capita GDP and total population data for each city over 2000-2012
from the China City Statistical Yearbook (CCSY). We match a city’s minimum wage and
economic data to firm-level data based on firms’ address information (city identification).
For descriptive statistics and data sources, see Table C3 and Table C4.
4.4 Empirical specification
We explore the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on importing and non-importing firm-
s’ innovation using manufacturing firm-level data in China from 2001 to 2013. Specifically,
we estimate the effects of minimum wage using the following regression model:
yit = β0 + β1min wagec,t−1 × importi,t−1 + β2min wagec,t−1 + β3importi,t−1
+γCi,t−1 + ϕi + ϕt + ǫit,
(27)
where yit is the log value of the number of all types of patent applications or invention
applications by firm i in year t.19 min wagec,t−1 is the log value of minimum wage in city
c in year t − 1. If firm i imports capital goods in year t − 1, then importi,t−1 is equal to
1; otherwise, importi,t−1 is equal to 0. The interaction term min wagec,t−1 × importi,t−1
captures the additional effect of minimum wage on importing firms. Ci,t−1 is a vector of
firm- and city-level control variables, including firm size as measured by total assets, firm
age, city GDP per capita, and city population size. ϕi denotes firm fixed effects, and ϕt
denotes year fixed effects. The standard errors ǫit are clustered at city level. According
to our theory, we expect that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Here, β1 + β2 captures the effects of
minimum wage on importing firms’ innovation, β2 captures the effects of minimum wage on
non-importing firms’ innovation, and β1 reflects the differentiation between importing firms
and non-importing firms.
5 Empirical results
We report our empirical results to test the theoretical predictions of the heterogeneous effects
of minimum wage on firms’ innovation.
19Given that some firms have zero patent applications, we add 1 to the number of patent applications.
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5.1 Baseline results
Table 1 reports the impact of minimum wage on patent applications using the baseline regres-
sion equation (27). The dependent variables are the number of all of the patent applications
(see columns 1-2) and the number of invention patent applications (see columns 3-4).20 In
columns 1 and 3, we include only firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. In columns 2
and 4, we add the firm- and city-level controls, including firm size, firm age, city-level GDP
per capita, and city-level population size. In column 2, the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term (min wage × import) is 0.241, which is statistically significant at the 1%
level. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term suggest d-
ifferentiation effects for importing firms and non-importing firms. Specifically, the estimated
coefficient on the minimum wage is -0.101, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The sum of these two coefficients (β1 + β2 = 0.140) is positive and statistically significant.
Hence a rise in minimum wage increases the importing firms’ number of all of the patent
applications, but decreases the non-importing firms’ number of all of the patent application-
s. When we move to columns 3-4 for the number of invention patent applications, we see
similar results: there exists a differentiated impact for importing firms and non-importing
firms. As the minimum wage rises, the number of invention patent applications increases for
importing firms and decreases for non-importing firms.
20Patents in CNIPA fall in three categories: invention, utility model, and design. Only invention patents
represent core technological progress, necessitating substantive examination of novelty and non-obviousness.
When we use utility patent applications and design patent applications, we also find the differentiated effects
for importing firms and non-importing firms (see Table C5 in the appendix). However, a minimum wage
increase has no positive impact on design patent applications.
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Table 1: Baseline results
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import 0.232*** 0.241*** 0.158*** 0.162***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
min wage -0.085*** -0.101*** -0.030*** -0.041***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
import -1.419*** -1.489*** -0.980*** -1.007***
(0.133) (0.127) (0.077) (0.074)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test β1 + β2 = 0 34.635 32.660 66.239 63.588
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545
Adj R-Squared 0.446 0.449 0.428 0.431
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered
at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifi-
cations 1 and 2 is the (log) number of all patent applications (after adding 1);
the dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of invention
patent applications (after adding 1). Controls include log firm size, log firm
age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the firm
fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. The F-test of all of the
columns test the sum of the estimated coefficients on min wage and min wage
× import. Probabilities (below 0.05) indicate that this equality is rejected at
the 5% confidence level.
It is natural to believe that spillover effects of importing goods to increase firms’ in-
novation are more prominent for capital goods and differentiated goods (Fan et al., 2015,
2018; Kruger and Verhoogen, 2009).21 Here, we adopt Rauch’s classification (Rauch, 1999)
to distinguish differentiated goods and homogeneous goods. In Table C6, we further divide
our sample into two subsamples: importing firms and non-importing firms. The dependent
variables are the number of all of the patent applications (see columns 1-4) and the number
of invention patent applications (see columns 5-8). As Table C6 shows, the increase of min-
imum wage decreases the non-importing firms’ patent applications. For importing firms, it
only improves the innovation level of firms importing capital goods or differentiated goods.
We consider several robustness checks to further examine our main results. First, we
alternatively define firms as importing firms according to whether they import capital goods
at the time they first appeared in the sample (see Table C7 in the appendix). Second, we add
industry-year fixed effects to capture time-varying industry characteristics, such as industrial
policies, that may influence firms’ innovation activities (see Table C8 in the appendix). In
these two tables, the estimated coefficients of minimum wage are significantly negative, and
those of the interaction term are significantly positive. This further supports our theoretical
predictions.
21This finding is consistent with the literature in that imports of capital goods increase economic growth,
TFP, and R&D (Cavallo and Landry, 2010; Mo et al., 2019).
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5.2 Endogeneity issue
This paper mainly investigates the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on firms’ innova-
tion. However, cities with higher levels of development may set higher minimum wage levels,
and these cities may also have relatively higher levels of innovation. To solve this potential
missing variable problem, we control the city’s per capita GDP level and firm fixed effects in
the benchmark regression, which can alleviate the endogenous problem to a certain extent.
However, other confounding factors may affect the association between minimum wage and
a firm’s patent applications. To solve potential endogenous problems, we adopt a variety of
methods for causal identification.
First, we use the approach developed by Dube et al. (2010) and adapted to China by Fan
et al. (2018) and Huang et al. (2014) to consider city pairs located near borders of different
provinces in order to exploit policy discontinuities at provincial borders. Specifically, we
consider two cities to be a pair if they share a border and belong to different provinces, and
assign the same ID to cities within a pair. If a city belongs to multiple city pairs, it has
multiple replicates in the city pair dataset.22 Then we match our baseline regression data
with the city pair data to obtain a firm-level city pair regression dataset including 2,172,545
observations. This new regression dataset can solve potential endogenous problems in two
ways. First, since neighboring cities may have similar economic characteristics (Dube et al.,
2010), we can solve the problem of time-varying unobserved factors by controlling the city-
pair-year fixed effects. Second, the minimum wage in border cities is often less affected by
the local economic situation. This is because the provincial government setting the minimum
wage standard is generally far from cities on its boundary.23
We add the city-pair-year fixed effects ϕpt to the benchmark regression (27) to control
city-pair time-varying shocks that may affect firms’ innovation, where p is the city pair ID.
After controlling city-pair-year fixed effects, we exploit the relative impact of the changes
in the minimum wage between the two cities. Following Dube et al. (2010) and Fan et
al. (2018), we use the high-dimensional robust standard error of clustering at the city and
city-pair-year levels. Table 2 shows the corresponding regression results. Odd columns
correspond to the regression result without weighting, and even columns to the regression
weighting by the inverse of the number of duplicates in the city pair firm-level sample. The
dependent variables are the number of all of the patent applications in the first two columns
and the number of invention patent applications in the last two columns. The estimated
coefficients on the interaction term (min wage× import) are significantly positive with the
similar value as them in the baseline regression. The estimated coefficients on the minimum
wage are significantly negative. Moreover, the absolute values of estimated coefficients on
the minimum wage are less than that on the interaction term. Therefore, we still find the
differentiated impact for importing firms and non-importing firms when using the city-pair-
year regression dataset. Specifically, a rise in the minimum wage increases the importing
firms’ number of patent applications but decreases that of non-importing firms.
22For example, Nanjing City in Jiangsu Province is adjacent to the borders of Ma’anshan City, Chuzhou
City, and Xuancheng City in Anhui Province. Therefore, in the city-pair data, Nanjing City will appear
three times.
23Since the minimum wages of the four municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are
directly determined by the government at the same level, we eliminated them in the city pair data.
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Table 2: Results by considering city pairs located near borders of different provinces
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted
min wage × import 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.183*** 0.182***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016)
min wage -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
import -1.586*** -1.590*** -1.131*** -1.130***
(0.163) (0.145) (0.111) (0.096)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-pair-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,172,545 2,172,545 2,172,545 2,172,545
Adj R-Squared 0.489 0.486 0.461 0.458
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors cor-
rected by two-way clustering at the city and city-pair-year levels are reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications 1 to 2 is the (log)
number of all patent applications (after adding 1); the dependent variable in
specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of invention patent applications (after
adding 1). Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita city GDP,
and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and city-pair-year
fixed effects in all specifications. Regressions in specifications 1 and 3 are un-
weighted, and those in specifications 2 and 4 are weighted by the inverse of the
number of duplicates in the city pair firm-level sample.
Second, we use instrumental variables (IV) to solve the problem of missing variables.
Specifically, we use the average minimum wage of similar cities in the same year as the
instrumental variable of the minimum wage. Because the economic characteristics of neigh-
boring cities are generally similar, we use the average minimum wage level of neighboring
cities in the same province as an IV for each city’s minimum wage. The regression results
are shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3. We refer to the method of Bai et al. (2018), and
rank cities by GDP per capita every year. We divide all of the cities from small to large into
20 groups, and use the average minimum wage of other cities in the same group as an IV
for the minimum wage of each city. The regression results are shown in columns 2 and 4 of
Table 3. Similar to baseline results, we find that the estimated coefficients on the interaction
term (min wage× import) are significantly positive, and that the estimated coefficients on
the minimum wage are significantly negative.24
24One concern with the instrumental variable approach is the weak instrument. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics reject the null hypothesis that the first stage is weakly identified.
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Table 3: Results by using instrumental variables for minimum wage
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
min wage × import 0.267*** 0.251*** 0.177*** 0.174***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014)
min wage -0.117*** -0.201 -0.036*** -0.063
(0.030) (0.135) (0.011) (0.072)
import -1.650*** -1.553*** -1.100*** -1.083***
(0.127) (0.139) (0.081) (0.086)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,004,530 2,234,545 2,004,530 2,234,545
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in
specifications 1 to 2 is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after
adding 1); the dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of
invention patent applications (after adding 1). Controls include log firm size,
log firm age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all of the specifications. The weak
identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) of specifications 1 and
3 is 515.488, and 13.099 for specifications 2 and 4.
Another concern about our baseline results is the endogeneity of firm import status. To
solve this potential endogenous problem, we follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and
Zhang (2017) and calculate the input tariff and output tariff of each 4-digit CIC industry
in China during the sample period.25 We use the input tariff as an IV for a firm’s import
status. The regression results are shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4. Then we use both
input tariff and output as IVs for a firm’s import status. The regression results are shown
in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. In Table 4, we also find that the estimated coefficients
on the interaction term (min wage × import) are significantly positive, and the estimated
coefficients on the minimum wage are significantly negative.
25HS 6-digit tariff data come from the World Integrated Trade Solution database (WITS) maintained by
the World Bank. Then we use Chinese input-output tables to calculate 4-digit CIC industry level input and
output tariffs.
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Table 4: Results by using instrument variables for import status
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV3 IV4 IV3 IV4
min wage × import 1.286*** 1.319*** 0.645*** 0.760***
(0.166) (0.132) (0.080) (0.074)
min wage -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.060*** -0.056***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012)
import -6.403*** -6.711*** -2.858*** -3.705***
(0.882) (0.719) (0.483) (0.443)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in
specifications 1 to 2 is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after
adding 1); the dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of
invention patent applications (after adding 1). Controls include log firm size,
log firm age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all of the specifications. The weak
identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) of specifications 1 and
3 is 44.950, and it is 26.709 for specifications 2 and 4.
5.3 Heterogeneous effects by sectoral capital intensity
We examine whether the effects of minimum wage on the innovation of importing and non-
importing firms differ by industry type. Intuitively, when the minimum wage rises by the
same amount, it has a relatively smaller effect on the marginal cost of production in capital-
intensive industries, and thus has a relatively smaller impact on a firm’s innovation in those
industries. We use the capital-labor ratio ln(K/L) of each 4-digit CIC industry in the early
2001 period to measure the capital intensity of an industry, and we use this variable to
interact with the explanatory variables in the benchmark equation (27). The regression
results are shown in Table 5, where columns 2 and 4 further control the industry-year and
city-year fixed effects. The coefficients of the triple term are significantly negative in all of
the columns of Table 5, indicating that the differentiated effect of the minimum wage on
the innovation of importing and non-importing firms is relatively small in capital-intensive
industries.
In all 4-digit CIC industries, the industry capital-labor ratio is 2.744 in the 5% quantile
and 4.675 in the 95% quantile. Taking column 1 as an example, for every 1% increase in
the minimum wage in an industry at the 5% quantile, the differentiated effects for importing
and non-importing firms are 0.302%.26 For every 1% increase in the minimum wage in an
26For every 1% increase in the minimum wage in an industry at the 5% quantile, importing firms’ all of
the patent applications increase by 0.193% ( -0.054% * 2.744 + 0.450% + 0.009% * 2.744 - 0.134%), vs. a
decrease of 0.109% (0.009% * 2.744 - 0.134%) for all non-importing firms.
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industry at the 95% quantile, the differentiated effects for importing and non-importing firms
are 0.198%.27 Therefore, the minimum wage on firms’ innovation has a greater differentiated
impact on labor-intensive industries than on capital-intensive industries. This is consistent
with the findings of Bai et al. (2018) and Fan et al. (2018). We also examined the hetero-
geneous effects for firms with lower capital-labor ratios and for firms paying lower average
wages, with regression results as shown in Table C9 and Table C10. Consistent with Table
8, we also find that the impact of minimum wage is more prominent for firms with lower
capital-intensity and average wages.
Table 5: Results by sectoral capital intensity
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import × sectorK/L -0.054** -0.028* -0.055*** -0.033***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
min wage × import 0.450*** 0.276*** 0.374*** 0.243***
(0.086) (0.064) (0.059) (0.045)
min wage × sectorK/L 0.009 -0.010 0.017*** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007)
import × sectorK/L 0.333** 0.176* 0.341*** 0.206***
(0.136) (0.095) (0.089) (0.068)
min wage -0.134*** -0.106***
(0.032) (0.017)
import -2.771*** -1.713*** -2.321*** -1.515***
(0.544) (0.403) (0.366) (0.283)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - Yes -
Industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
City-year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,234,530 2,234,518 2,234,530 2,234,518
Adj R-Squared 0.449 0.463 0.432 0.446
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications 1 to 2
is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after adding 1); the dependent
variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of invention patent applications
(after adding 1). SectorK/L is the capital-labor ratio of each 4-digit CIC industry in
the early 2001 period. Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita city
GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed effects
in specifications 1 and 3. We control the firm fixed effects, 4-digit CIC industry-year
fixed effects, and city-year fixed effects in specifications 2 and 4.
5.4 Other firm-level responses
We analyze the heterogeneous effect of the minimum wage on firms’ other performance,
including patent citations, export products, total factor productivity (TFP), and labor em-
27For every 1% increase in minimum wage in an industry at the 95% quantile, importing firms’ all of
the patent applications increase by 0.106% (0.054% * 4.675 + 0.450 % + 0.009% * 4.675 - 0.134%), vs. a
decrease of 0.092% (0.009% * 4.675 - 0.134%) for non-importing firms.
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ployment. The regression results are shown in Table 6.
In column 1, we examine the impact of the minimum wage on the quality of a firm’s
patents. Taking the number of citations of invention patents as the dependent variable, we
find that for every 1% increase in minimum wage, the differentiated impact of minimum
wage on the number of citations of invention patents for importing and non-importing firms
is 0.145%. Similar to patent citations, the number of products also can portray a firm’s
innovation. In column 2, we use the number of HS 8-digit export products for each firm
as the dependent variable. As shown in column 2, there exists a heterogeneous effect of
the minimum wage on a firm’s number of export products. The increase in minimum wage
increases the number of products exported by importing firms, and reduces the number of
products exported by non-importing firms. We examine the heterogeneous effect of minimum
wage on a firm’s total factor productivity in column 3. We use the method of Olley and
Pakes (1996) to calculate the TFP level. The result shows that compared to non-importing
firms, the increase in minimum wage increases the importing firms’ TFP by 0.149% after a
1% increase in minimum wage.28
Finally, we examine the heterogeneous effect of minimum wage on labor employment.
According to our theory, comparing the non-importing firms, the labor used by importing
firms decreases more after the minimum wage increase, due to the higher spillover effect for
importing firms. In column 4, labor employment is the dependent variable. Consistent with
our predictions, we find that the heterogeneous effect of minimum wage on labor employment
for importing firms and non-importing firms. This is to say, the employed labor decreases
more for importing firms after the minimum wage rises.29
28Because the value-added and intermediate input are no longer reported in ASIF form 2011 to 2013, we
follow Brandt, Wang, and Zhang (2017) to estimate them as follows. We use the ASIF data from 2004-2007
to construct a 4-digit CIC industry-level multiplier, which is equal to the average of the ratio of firms’ total
labor cost (the sum of wage bills, employment insurance, welfare, pension, and housing funds) over the wage
bill, and apply it to the value of the wage bill from 2011 to 2013 to get their total labor cost. Then we estimate
the total production cost of each firm as total production cost = total output ∗ (sales cost/sales revenue).
We calculate intermediate input, which is total production cost− total labor cost− depreciation, and value-
added, which is total output− intermediate input+value added tax. Then we use sector-level price deflators
(output, input, and capital) from Brandt et al. (2012) to deflate to real output, input, and capital. Finally,
we use the method of Olley and Pakes (1996) to calculate the TFP level. Many variables are missing in the
ASIF data of 2009. We cannot estimate the firms’ TFP level in 2009, so the sample number in column 3 of
Table 6 is reduced by a part.
29It is even better if we can test how a rise in minimum wage affects the R&D labor employment of
importing and non-importing firms. However, we cannot obtain firm- , city-, or city-industry-level R&D
labor employment data.
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Table 6: Results by other firm-level responses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
citations products TFP labor
min wage × import 0.145*** 4.169*** 0.149*** -0.097***
(0.013) (0.410) (0.018) (0.032)
min wage -0.039*** -0.742*** -0.024 -0.020
(0.010) (0.137) (0.041) (0.040)
import -0.897*** -25.857*** -0.941*** 0.694***
(0.082) (2.707) (0.119) (0.206)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 1,820,071 2,234,545
Adj R-Squared 0.392 0.717 0.641 0.809
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered
at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in spec-
ification 1 is the (log) number of firms’ invention patents cited (after adding
1); the dependent variable in specification 2 is the number of firms’ HS 8-digit
export products; the dependent variable in specification 3 is the TFP level cal-
culated by the method of Olley and Pakes (1996); the dependent variable in
specification 4 is the (log) number of labor employment. Controls include log
firm size, log firm age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We
control the firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all of the specifications.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on innovation
of different types of firms. Using an open-economy R&D-based growth model, we have
shown that raising the minimum wage reduces innovation of firms that use domestic inputs
but increases innovation of firms that import foreign inputs. These heterogeneous effects of
minimum wage on the innovation of the two types of firms are consistent with the empirical
results that we have estimated using city-level data on minimum wages and firm-level patent
data in China. Previous studies that explore the overall effect of minimum wage on firm-level
innovation may have neglected the heterogeneous responses of different types of firms. Our
paper fills this gap in the literature.
The results of our study have important implications for policy makers. As the labor
costs increase in China, policy makers should further open up the economy for international
trade, especially trade on capital goods. Tariff cuts on capital goods would induce more
firms to import capital goods. Such a policy would stimulate innovation in China due to the
positive impacts of minimum wage on innovation of firms importing capital goods.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We first derive the steady-state equilibrium condition that
determines Φft . Using (7), (10b), and the equation p
f
t (ω) = pz/α, we obtain
(nft )
1
αxft =
αΦft
2pz
(nft )
1−α
α Yt. (A1)
Substituting (A1) and (22b) in (24), we have
Φft =
α
[
αµΦft (n
f
t )
1−α
α
](ε−1)/ε
(1− α)
[
pz(1− Φ
f
t )
](ε−1)/ε
+ α
[
αµΦft (n
f
t )
1−α
α
](ε−1)/ε , (A2)
which can be expressed as
Φft =
(nft )
(1−α)(ε−1)
α
(1− α)ε(pz)ε−1/(α2ε−1µε−1) + (n
f
t )
(1−α)(ε−1)
α
≡ f(nft ) ∈ (0, 1). (A3)
It is useful to note that f ′(nft ) > 0 and f
′′(nft ) < 0 because ε > 1. From (26), the steady-
state levels of R&D spending must satisfy Rd = Φdt /(Φ
d
t + Φ
f
t ) ∈ (0, 1) and R
f = Φft /(Φ
d
t +
Φft ) ∈ (0, 1), where Φ
f
t ∈ (0, 1) from (A3). Then we combine n
f = (1 + λΦf )Rf/δ and
Rf = Φft /(Φ
d
t + Φ
f
t ) in the following expression:
δnf
1 + λΦf
= Rf =
Φf
Φd + Φf
,
which can be expressed as:
nf =
1
δ
Φf
(
1 + λΦf
)
Φd + Φf
. (A4)
Finally, substituting (A3) in (A4) yields:
Ψ(µ)
1
Φf
(
Φf
1− Φf
) α
(1−α)(ε−1)
=
1 + λΦf
Φd + Φf
, (A5a)
where
Ψ(µ) ≡ δ
(
1− α
α2−1/ε
) αε
(1−α)(ε−1)
(
pz
µ
) α
1−α
,
which is decreasing in µ. Due to symmetry between f and d, we can derive the condition
that determines Φd in a similar way to the above:
Γ(µ)
1
Φd
(
Φd
1− Φd
) α
(1−α)(ε−1)
=
1
Φd + Φf
, (A5b)
where
Γ(µ) ≡ δ
(
1− α
α2−1/ε
) αε
(1−α)(ε−1)
(
1
µ
) α
1−α
.
Note that the two equations in (A5) determine
(
Φd,Φf
)
in equilibrium. Then we have the
following lemmas.
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Lemma 1 If ε < (1− α/2)/(1− α), then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. We express (A5) as:
Φd =
[
ζ(Φf )− 1
]
Φf , (A6a)
Φf =
[
1
Γ(µ)
(
1− Φd
Φd
)Ω
− 1
]
Φd, (A6b)
where we have defined
Ω ≡
α
(1− α) (ε− 1)
,
ζ(Φf ) ≡
1 + λΦf
Ψ(µ)
(
1− Φf
Φf
)Ω
.
Substituting (A6a) in (A6b) and rearranging some terms yields:[
Γ(µ)
ζ(Φf )
ζ(Φf )− 1
]1/Ω
=
1
[ζ(Φf )− 1] Φf
− 1. (A7)
Multiplying both sides of (A7) by [ζ(Φf )− 1]/ζ(Φf ), we obtain[
ζ(Φf )− 1
ζ(Φf )
](Ω−1)/Ω
=
1
[Γ(µ)]1/Ω
[
1 + Φf
ζ(Φf )Φf
− 1
]
. (A8)
Suppose ε < (1 − α/2)/(1 − α), which is equivalent to Ω > 2. Then, as Φf increases
from 0 to 1, both ζ(Φf ) and ζ(Φf )Φf decrease from infinity to 0.30 Therefore, we can
define two threshold values of Φf , denoted as {Φf
−
,Φf+} ∈ (0, 1) such that ζ(Φ
f
+) = 1 and
Φf
−
ζ(Φf
−
) = 1+Φf
−
. It is useful to note that Φf
−
< Φf+ because ζ(Φ
f
+) < ζ(Φ
f
−
) = 1+1/Φf
−
.31
As shown in Figure A1, the left side of (A8) decreases from 1 to 0 as Φf increases from
0 to Φf+, whereas the right side increases from 0 to infinity as Φ
f increases from Φf
−
to 1.
Given Φf
−
< Φf+, (A8) uniquely determines the equilibrium value of Φ
f ∈ (0, 1), which then
determines the equilibrium value of Φd ∈ (0, 1) in (A6a).
Lemma 2 Φf is increasing in µ.
Proof. Given that the left-hand side (LHS) of (A8) is increasing in ζ(Φf ) and that ζ(Φf )
is also increasing in µ,32 an increase in µ shifts up the LHS to the right in Figure A1. Then
the right-hand side (RHS) of (A8) can be divided into two parts, as follows:
RHS =
1 + Φf
Φf
1
Γ(µ)1/Ωζ(Φf )
−
1
Γ(µ)1/Ω
.
Γ(µ)1/Ω is decreasing in µ and ζ(Φf ) is increasing in µ; however, it can be shown that
Γ(µ)1/Ωζ(Φf ) is increasing in µ given Ω > 1. Therefore, the first term in the RHS is
decreasing in µ. In addition, the second term, −1/Γ(µ)1/Ω, is also decreasing in µ. As
a result, an increase in µ shifts down the RHS also to the right in Figure A1. Finally, the
shifts in the LHS and RHS give rise to an increase in Φf .
30It can be shown that ζ(Φf )Φf is decreasing in Φf if Ω > max{2− 1/λ, 1}.
31Recall that ζ(Φf ) is decreasing in Φf .
32Note that ζ(Φf ) is decreasing in Ψ(µ), which in turn is decreasing in µ.
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Figure A1: Equilibrium uniqueness
Lemma 3 Φf/Φd is increasing in µ if and only if λ > 0.
Proof. Given the unique equilibrium in Lemma 1, we combine (A5a) and (A5b) and apply
the approximation ln(1 + Φi) ≈ Φi to derive
Φf − Φd =
1
2Ω− 1
[
−
α
1− α
ln pz + λΦ
f (µ
+
)
]
, (A9)
which shows that ln(Φf/Φd) = lnΦf − ln Φd ≈ Φf −Φd is increasing in µ if and only if λ > 0.
Lemma 4 Lf/Ld is decreasing in µ if and only if λ > 0.
Proof. From (22), we have Lf/Ld = (1− Φf )/(1− Φd). Then, applying the approximation
ln(1 + Φi) ≈ Φi yields33
ln(Lf/Ld) ≈ Φd − Φf =
1
2Ω− 1
[
α
1− α
ln pz − λΦ
f (µ
+
)
]
, (A10)
which is decreasing in µ if and only if λ > 0.
Given λI = λΦf and Rf/Rd = Φf/Φd, Lemmas 1–4 give a complete proof of all the
results in Proposition 1.
33We can also prove this result without using the approximation. Derivations are available upon request.
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Appendix B
According to the extension in Section 3.1, we have to make the following changes. The
profit for domestic capital goods becomes
πdt (ω) = p
d
t (ω)x
d
t (ω)−
[
ψd + pz
(
1− ψd
)]
xdt (ω) = Φ
d
t
P dt X
d
t∫ ndt
0
[xdt (ω)]
αdω
[xdt (ω)]
α − ψ˜dxdt (ω),
(11’)
where ψ˜d ≡ ψ + pz (1− ψ) . Given that the monopolistic price is now p
d
t (ω) = ψ˜
d/α,
πdt (ω) =
1− α
α
ψ˜xdt (ω) = (1− α) Φ
d
t
P dt X
d
t
ndt
= (1− α) Φdt
Yt
2ndt
≡ πdt . (12’)
Note that πdt itself does not change, and so neither does (13). The profit for foreign capital
goods also becomes:
πft (ω) = p
f
t (ω)x
f
t (ω)− [(1− ψ) + pzψ]x
f
t (ω) = Φ
f
t
P ft X
f
t∫ nft
0
[xft (ω)]
αdω
[xft (ω)]
α − ψ˜fxft (ω), (14’)
where ψ˜f ≡ 1− ψ + pzψ. Given p
f
t (ω) = ψ˜
f/α,
πft (ω) =
1− α
α
ψ˜fxft (ω) = (1− α) Φ
f
t
P ft X
f
t
nft
= (1− α) Φft
Yt
2nft
≡ πft . (15’)
Like πdt , π
f
t (16) do not alter.
We should reconsider the structure of R&D externalities. Firms in this sector d devote
1/(1+λdIt) units of domestic high-skill research labor to invent a new variety of differentiated
products. The zero-profit condition is: vdt = w
h
t /(1 + λdI
d
t ). The law of motion for n
d
t is
n˙dt = (1 + λdIt)R
d
t − δn
d
t , (18’)
where
It ≡
pz,t (1− ψ)
∫ ndt
0
xdt (ω)dω + pz,tψ
∫ nft
0
xft (ω)dω
Yt
≡
α
2
Φ˜t
and
Φ˜t ≡
pz (1− ψ)
ψ + pz (1− ψ)
Φdt +
pzψ
1− ψ + pzψ
Φft .
Defining λd ≡ λdα/2, the zero-profit condition becomes
(1 + λdΦ˜t)v
d
t = w
h
t . (17’)
Accordingly, we need to make revisions such that
n˙ft = (1 + λfIt)R
f
t − δn
f
t , (19’)
(1 + λf Φ˜t)v
f
t = w
h
t , (20’)
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and
nf
nd
=
(1 + λf Φ˜)Φf
(1 + λdΦ˜)Φd
. (25’)
There is no change on (26).
Using the above revised equations, we will check the robustness of the results in Proposi-
tion 1, basically following the method in Appendix A. Using (7) and (10b), and noting that
pft (ω) = ψ˜
f/α, we obtain
(nft )
1
αxft =
αΦft
2ψ˜f
(nft )
1−α
α Yt. (B1)
Substituting (B1) and (22b) in (24), we have
Φft =
α
[
αµΦft (n
f
t )
1−α
α
](ε−1)/ε
(1− α)
[
ψ˜f (1− Φft )
](ε−1)/ε
+ α
[
αµΦft (n
f
t )
1−α
α
](ε−1)/ε , (B2)
which can be expressed as:
Φft =
(nft )
(1−α)(ε−1)
α
(1− α)ε(ψ˜f )ε−1/(α2ε−1µε−1) + (nft )
(1−α)(ε−1)
α
≡ f˜(nft ) ∈ (0, 1). (B3)
Noting that nf = (1 + λf Φ˜)Rf/δ and Rf = Φft /(Φ
d
t + Φ
f
t ) into the following expression:
δnf
1 + λf Φ˜
= Rf =
Φf
Φd + Φf
,
which can be expressed as
nf =
1
δ
Φf
(
1 + λf Φ˜
)
Φd + Φf
. (B4)
Then we have
Ψ˜(µ)
1
Φf
(
Φf
1− Φf
) α
(1−α)(ε−1)
=
1 + λf Φ˜
Φd + Φf
, (B5a)
where
Ψ˜(µ) ≡ δ
(
1− α
α2−1/ε
) αε
(1−α)(ε−1)
(
ψ˜f
µ
) α
1−α
,
which is decreasing in µ. Due to symmetry between f and d, we can derive the condition
that determines Φd in a similar way to the above:
Γ˜(µ)
1
Φd
(
Φd
1− Φd
) α
(1−α)(ε−1)
=
1 + λdΦ˜
Φd + Φf
, (B5b)
where
Γ˜(µ) ≡ δ
(
1− α
α2−1/ε
) αε
(1−α)(ε−1)
(
ψ˜d
µ
) α
1−α
.
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The two equations in (B5) determine
(
Φd,Φf
)
in equilibrium, which can be rewritten as:
Φd =
[
1
Ψ˜(µ)
(
1 + pzψ
1−ψ+pzψ
λfΦf
)(
1−Φf
Φf
)Ω
− 1
]
Φf
1− 1
Ψ˜(µ)
pz(1−ψ)
ψ+pz(1−ψ)
λfΦf
(
1−Φf
Φf
)Ω ≡ ϑ1(Φf )ϑ2(Φf ) (B6a)
Φf =
[
1
Γ˜(µ)
(
1 + pz(1−ψ)
ψ+pz(1−ψ)
λdΦd
)(
1−Φd
Φd
)Ω
− 1
]
Φd
1− 1
Γ˜(µ)
pzψ
1−ψ+pzψ
λdΦd
(
1−Φd
Φd
)Ω . (B6b)
Under Ω > 2, as Φf increases from 0 to 1, ϑ1(Φ
f ) decreases from +∞ to −1, and ϑ2(Φ
f )
increases from −∞ to +1. In addition, ϑ1(z) > 0 holds when z satisfies ϑ2(z) = 0. Thus
Φf has a lower (upper) bound that is strictly higher (lower) than 0 (1), such that Φf ∈
(Φf
−−
,Φf++) ⊂ (0, 1). We can also show that Φ
d is bounded in a similar way.
When ψ → 1, λf in the extension model converges to λ in the original model. Noting
this, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 When ψ → 1, (B6) uniformly converges to (A6).
Proof. First, we prove uniform convergence of (B6a) to (A6a). Taking ψ → 1, for any(
Φd,Φf
)
, we have
Φd
∣∣
ψ→1
=
[
1
Ψ˜(µ)
(
1 + λfΦf
)(1− Φf
Φf
)Ω
− 1
]
Φf ≡ Φd∗. (B7)
Given that (B7) is equivalent to (A6a), there is a pointwise convergence of (B6a) to (A6a).
To prove the convergence is also uniform, we use the following well-known property. In
general, a real-valued function defined on X, denoted as h(x;n), uniformly converges to h∗
if and only if supx∈X(h(x;n)−h
∗)→ 0 as n→∞. Applying this to our case, we first define:
d(ψ) ≡ sup
Φf∈(Φ
f
−−
,Φf++)
∣∣∣∣ϑ1(Φf )ϑ2(Φf ) − Φd∗
∣∣∣∣ . (B8)
Then, by (B6a) and (B7), we can rewrite (B8) as:
d(ψ) = (1− ψ) sup
Φf∈(Φf
−−
,Φf++)
ϑ(Φf ;ψ), (B9)
where ϑ(Φf ;ψ) is some function in Φf and ψ.34 Since we can show ϑ(Φf ;ψ) is bounded
because Φf ∈ (Φf
−−
,Φf++), supΦf ϑ(Φ
f ;ψ) takes some finite value, say ϑ˜(ψ) <∞. Therefore,
34The formal definition is:
ϑ(Φf ) ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
1
1−ψ+pzψ
+ pz
ψ+pz(1−ψ)
(
1− 1
Ψ˜(µ)
(
1 + λfΦf
) (
1−Φf
Φf
)Ω)
1− 1
Ψ˜(µ)
pz(1−ψ)
ψ+pz(1−ψ)
λfΦf
(
1−Φf
Φf
)Ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λf
(
1− Φf
)Ω
Ψ˜(µ) (Φf )
Ω−2
.
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by (B9) and the definition of ϑ, it is easy to show that d(ψ) = (1− ψ) ϑ˜(ψ)→ 0 as ψ → 1.
The proof of (B6b) follows in a similar way, paying attention to the assumption that λd → 0
as ψ → 1.
Given this lemma, there exists some sufficiently large ψ, say ψˆ < 1, such that the results
derived from (B6) are qualitatively equivalent to those from (A6) for ψ ∈ [ψˆ, 1].
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Appendix C:
Table C1: Minimum wage on imported capital goods, capital, and capital-labor ratio
(1) (2) (3)
imp value capital K/L
min wage 0.199*** 0.360*** 0.377***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545
Adj R-Squared 0.714 0.861 0.716
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust s-
tandard errors clustered at the city level are reported in
parentheses. The dependent variable in specification 1 is
the (log) number of firms’ importing capital goods (after
adding 1); the dependent variable in specification 2 is the
(log of) firms’ capital; the dependent variable in specifica-
tion 3 is the (log of) firms’ capital-labor ratio. Controls
include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita city GDP,
and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects
and year fixed effects in all specifications.
34
We match three set firm-level data by firms’ name. Therefore, to improve matching
efficiency, we first clean firms’ names as follows: (1) delete spaces, punctuation marks, and
other symbols; (2) standardize all letters in firm and applicant names in capital form in
English style; (3) single out five high-frequency general terms by statistical analysis and
drop them: “limited,” “liability,” “stock,” “company,” “factory;” (4) delete general terms
for regions: “province,” “autonomous region,” “city,” “district,” “county.” Then we match
import data and patent data with ASIF data, year by year. The sample period is from
2001 to 2013, and we have 2,234,545 observations of 436,514 manufacturing firms after data
cleaning.35 The matching results are shown in Table C2.
Table C2: Matching results of import and patent data to ASIF data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year ASIF firms Import All patents Invention
2001 81,834 9,800 15,660 2,288
2002 105,055 11,381 24,731 5,564
2003 116,247 12,918 30,862 8,884
2004 124,672 14,164 37,103 12,142
2005 195,292 20,450 55,448 18,481
2006 213,175 19,793 76,564 27,728
2007 239,351 21,442 96,944 35,781
2008 257,107 22,304 126,870 44,103
2009 256,554 20,647 167,300 53,745
2011 183,643 17,569 262,346 79,359
2012 238,228 22,472 417,047 125,031
2013 223,387 20,824 413,947 144,100
Notes: Specification 1 is the number of firms in our sam-
ple. Specification 2 is the number of firms which imported
capital goods at t− 1. Specification 3 is the number of all
three types of patent applications at t. Specification 4 is
the number of invention patent applications at t.
35ASIF data in 2010 include some misreported information, so we drop it.
35
Table C3: Summary statistics of key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent Variables
all patents 2,234,545 0.128 0.515 0 8.757
invention 2,234,545 0.050 0.290 0 8.668
utility 2,234,545 0.079 0.378 0 7.196
design 2,234,545 0.034 0.274 0 7.049
citations 2,234,545 0.065 0.400 0 10.574
products 2,234,545 1.862 6.687 0 764
TFP 1,820,071 2.608 1.030 -7.649 9.147
labor 2,234,545 5.038 1.081 0 12.145
imp value 2,234,545 0.625 2.132 0 17.852
capital 2,234,545 8.890 1.684 0 19.011
K/L 2,234,545 3.852 1.374 -7.424 13.957
Independent Variables
min wage 2,234,545 6.430 0.418 5.075 7.313
import 2,234,545 0.096 0.294 0 1
import2 2,234,545 0.100 0.300 0 1
Control Variables
firmsize 2,234,545 10.089 1.436 0 20.160
age 2,234,545 2.044 0.771 0 4.159
GDP per capita 2,234,545 10.375 0.911 5.958 13.018
population 2,234,545 6.249 0.604 2.770 8.115
Notes: All patents, invention, utility, design, citations, and imp value are
logarithmic after adding 1. Labor, capital, and K/L are logarithmic. All
independent variables and control variables are in year t− 1.
Table C4: Data sources of key variables
(1) (2)
Variables Definition Data source
all patents Log of patent applications CNIPA
invention Log of invention patent applications CNIPA
utility Log of utility-model patent applications CNIPA
design Log of design patent applications CNIPA
citations Log of number of firms’ patents cited Google Patent
products Number of products firms export CGAC
TFP Total factor productivity by Olley-Pakes method ASIF
labor Log of the number of labor ASIF
imp value Log of total amount of imported capital goods CGAC
capital Log of capital ASIF
K/L Log of capital-labor ratio ASIF
min wage Log of monthly minimum wage at city level Local government websites
import Dummy variable of import capital goods CGAC
import2 Dummy variable of import capital goods (alternative definition) CGAC
firmsize Log of total assets ASIF
age Log of firm age ASIF
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita at city level CCSY
population Log of population at city level CCSY
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Table C5: Results by different categories of patent applications
Utility models Design
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.022** 0.025**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
min wage -0.062*** -0.071*** -0.028*** -0.032***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
import -1.240*** -1.283*** -0.121* -0.146**
(0.093) (0.090) (0.062) (0.062)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545
Adj R-Squared 0.409 0.412 0.329 0.329
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered
at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in spec-
ifications 1 to 2 is the (log of) utility model applications (after adding 1); the
dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log of) design applications
(after adding 1). Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita city
GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects in all of the specifications.
Table C6: Results by different types of imported goods
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
min wage -0.085*** 0.030 -0.031 -0.029 -0.031*** 0.039 -0.003 0.016
(0.016) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.008) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
min wage × capital share 0.266*** 0.180***
(0.019) (0.012)
capital share -1.723*** -1.160***
(0.117) (0.079)
min wage × differential 0.091*** 0.035***
(0.016) (0.009)
differential -0.608*** -0.230***
(0.101) (0.061)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,818,515 387,221 387,221 387,221 1,818,515 387,221 387,221 387,221
Adj R-Squared 0.383 0.565 0.567 0.566 0.344 0.567 0.568 0.567
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are reported in
parentheses. The sample in specifications 1 and 5 is of non-importing firms; the sample in specifications 2 to 4 and
6 to 8 is of importing firms. The dependent variable in specifications 1 to 4 is the (log) number of all of the patent
applications (after adding 1); the dependent variable in specifications 5 to 8 is the (log) number of invention patent
applications (after adding 1). Capital share is the share of imported capital goods of all of the imported goods;
differential is the share of imported differentiated goods of all of the imported goods. Controls include log firm size,
log firm age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed effects
in all of the specifications.
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Table C7: Results by alternative definition of import status
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import2 0.096*** 0.122*** 0.082*** 0.094***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
min wage -0.084*** -0.101*** -0.030*** -0.041***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545 2,234,545
Adj R-Squared 0.443 0.447 0.425 0.429
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in
specifications 1 to 2 is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after
adding 1); the dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number
of invention patent applications (after adding 1). Import2 is equal to 1 when
firms import capital goods at the time they first appeared in the sample, and
otherwise is equal to 0. Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per
capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and
year fixed effects in all of the specifications.
Table C8: Results by controlling industry-year fixed effects
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import 0.157*** 0.167*** 0.119*** 0.123***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011)
min wage -0.066*** -0.081*** -0.029*** -0.038***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
import -0.947*** -1.020*** -0.733*** -0.763***
(0.126) (0.119) (0.075) (0.071)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,234,533 2,234,533 2,234,533 2,234,533
Adj R-Squared 0.456 0.459 0.439 0.442
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in
specifications 1 to 2 is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after
adding 1); the dependent variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of
invention patent applications (after adding 1). Controls include log firm size,
log firm age, log per capita city GDP, and log city population. We control the
firm fixed effects and the 4-digit CIC industry-year fixed effects in all of the
specifications.
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Table C9: Heterogeneous effects by firms’ capital-labor ratio
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import × firmK/L -0.018** -0.020*** -0.005 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
min wage × import 0.300*** 0.233*** 0.170*** 0.137***
(0.045) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024)
min wage × firmK/L 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
import × firmK/L 0.108** 0.124*** 0.034 0.052*
(0.050) (0.045) (0.029) (0.031)
min wage -0.203*** -0.122***
(0.020) (0.013)
import -1.845*** -1.439*** -1.058*** -0.860***
(0.283) (0.243) (0.155) (0.149)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - Yes -
Industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
City-year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,234,545 2,234,533 2,234,545 2,234,533
Adj R-Squared 0.450 0.464 0.432 0.446
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications 1 to 2
is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after adding 1); the dependent
variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of invention patent applications
(after adding 1). FirmK/L is the firms’ capital-labor ratio at the time they first
appeared in the sample. Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita
city GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects in specifications 1 and 3, and the firm fixed effects, 4-digit CIC industry-year
fixed effects, and city-year fixed effects in specifications 2 and 4.
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Table C10: Heterogeneous effects by firms’ average wage
all patents invention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min wage × import × firmwage -0.042*** -0.054*** -0.009 -0.028**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
min wage × import 0.340*** 0.321*** 0.172*** 0.191***
(0.044) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030)
min wage × firmwage 0.075*** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
import × firmwage 0.230** 0.317*** 0.042 0.171**
(0.095) (0.087) (0.069) (0.070)
min wage -0.250*** -0.143***
(0.026) (0.015)
import -2.006*** -1.921*** -1.025*** -1.169***
(0.274) (0.240) (0.185) (0.182)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - Yes -
Industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
City-year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,094,117 2,094,105 2,094,117 2,094,105
Adj R-Squared 0.445 0.459 0.426 0.441
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications 1 to 2
is the (log) number of all of the patent applications (after adding 1); the dependent
variable in specifications 3 to 4 is the (log) number of invention patent applications
(after adding 1). Firmwage is the firms’ wage per worker at the time they first
appeared in the sample. Controls include log firm size, log firm age, log per capita
city GDP, and log city population. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects in specifications 1 and 3, and the firm fixed effects, 4-digit CIC industry-year
fixed effects, and city-year fixed effects in specifications 2 and 4.
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